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Quantum cryptography and quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) have been the most success-
ful applications of quantum information process-
ing, highlighting the unique capability of quan-
tum mechanics, through the no-cloning theo-
rem, to protect the security of shared encryp-
tion keys. Here we present a new and fundamen-
tally different approach to high-capacity, high-
efficiency QKD by exploiting interplay between
cross-disciplinary ideas from quantum informa-
tion and light scattering of aperiodic photonic
media. The novelty of the proposed approach re-
lies on a unique type of entangled-photon source
and a new physical mechanism for efficiently shar-
ing keys. The new source produces entangled
photons with orbital angular momenta (OAM)
randomly distributed among Fibonacci numbers.
Combining entanglement with the mathematical
properties of Fibonacci sequences leads to a new
QKD protocol. This Fibonacci protocol is im-
mune to photon-number-splitting attacks and al-
lows secure generation of long keys from few pho-
tons. Unlike other protocols, reference frame
alignment and active modulation of production
and detection bases are unnecessary, since secu-
rity does not require use of non-orthogonal polar-
ization measurements.
Much recent work in QKD has shifted from use of two-
dimensional polarization spaces to larger Hilbert spaces.
Coding capacity and security increase with the size of the
Hilbert space, and with the number of mutually unbi-
ased bases used for security checks1–5. The most promis-
ing way to achieve larger Hilbert spaces is via optical
OAM6,7. However, the only practical way to produce
entangled OAM states is with spontaneous parametric
down conversion (SPDC), in which production ampli-
tudes drop off rapidly with increasing OAM. In addition,
eavesdropper detection in standard protocols requires ac-
tive modulation of production and detection bases, slow-
ing key generation rates exponentially as the range of
OAM values increases.
Wavefront engineering of light traditionally relies
on gradual phase shifts accumulated along optical
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beam paths. Recently, optical beams carrying sin-
gle OAM states have been realized using planar plas-
monic interfaces8. Additionally, distinctive scattering
resonances carrying OAM have been demonstrated in
nanoplasmonic Vogel spiral arrays9, and the Vogel spi-
ral geometry has been shown to support multifrac-
tal photonic band gaps with bandedge modes carrying
multiple OAM values distributed among the Fibonacci
numbers10,11. It has been analytically demonstrated that
Vogel spiral arrays can generate multiple OAM states
encoding well-defined numerical sequences in their far-
field radiation patterns12. In the case of golden an-
gle (GA) spirals, the generated states carry OAM that
follow the Fibonacci sequence. (Recall that the Fi-
bonacci sequence13 obeys the recursion relation Fn =
Fn−1 + Fn−2, with initial values F1 = 1 and F2 = 2.)
Here, we combine GA spiral arrays with SPDC in a
nonlinear crystal to engineer a new type of entangled
light source, producing photon pairs whose OAM values
always sum to a Fibonacci number, allowing efficient pro-
duction of states with large OAM values with properties
that can be exploited in new ways. We show that these
special properties of entangled Fibonacci OAM states al-
low encryption keys with large numbers of digits to be
generated by much smaller numbers of photons, exceed-
ing the two bits per photon provided by quantum dense
coding14, while maintaining high security. The approach
uses entanglement, as in the Ekert protocol15 (though it
is used in a fundamentally different manner); however
it requires one of the two legitimate users of the channel
(Alice) to make her measurement before any opportunity
for eavesdropping, as in the BB8416 protocol.
Entangled Fibonacci spiral source. A Vogel spiral
is an array of N particles with polar positions (rn, θn)
given in terms of scaling factor a0 and divergence angle
α by
rn =
√
na0 (1)
θn = nα (2)
An array of point scatterers, as in Figure 1(a), is then
represented by a density function:
ρ(r, θ) =
N∑
n=1
δ(r −√na0)δ(θ − nα) (3)
We have previously shown that the Fraunhofer far-field of
Vogel spirals can be calculated analytically, within scalar
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2FIG. 1: (a) Schematic of GA spiral Fibonacci OAM genera-
tor. (b) Far-field pattern of GA spiral within a 2◦ half-angle
cone for a structure with 2000 particles and a0 = 9.28µm at
405 nm. (c) Hankel transform of image in b. (d) Sum of c
over k, with peaks at Fibonacci values.
diffraction theory, for arbitrary α and a0
12. In cylindrical
coordinates, the far-field of a diffracted input beam is
given by12
E∞(νr, νθ) = E0
N∑
n=1
ej2pi
√
na0νrcos(νθ−nα) (4)
where (νr, νθ) are the Fourier conjugate variables of (r, θ).
As seen in Fig. 1(c), Fourier-Hankel analysis of the cal-
culated far-field radiation pattern (shown in Figure 1(b))
is performed to decompose it into radial and azimuthal
components, providing the OAM values10,12,17. We see
in Figure 1(d) that for GA spirals, OAM values are dis-
cretized in azimuthal numbers following the Fibonacci se-
quence. This follows directly from the geometrical prop-
erties of GA spirals encoded in the far-field patterns10,12.
Fig. 2 then shows a schematic of our full QKD setup, in
which the properties of the spiral source lead to a novel
approach to high capacity QKD.
New QKD Protocol. In E9115 and BB8416 proto-
cols, photon polarization provides digits of a key (assign-
ing, for example, 1 to horizontal polarization and 0 to ver-
tical) and also provides security against eavesdropping:
Alice and Bob each randomly pick one of two complemen-
tary bases in which to measure the photon polarization,
keeping only photons for which the bases match. Eaves-
dropping is detectable by a drop in polarization correla-
tions. OAM analogs of these protocols work in a similar
manner, but with increased key generation capacity2–5,
allowing multiple-digit segments of key to be transmitted
by a single photon.
The light coming from the spiral will be in a superpo-
FIG. 2: Setup for QKD with Fibonacci-valued OAM states.
A laser interacts with a spiral array (a) , producing intense
Fibonacci OAM states with l = Fn that are used to pump
the nonlinear crystal (b), producing signal-idler pairs through
SPDC. The OAM sorters (c) are arranged to only allow pho-
tons to reach the arrays (DA and DB) of single-photon de-
tectors if they also are Fibonacci-valued, with OAM Fni and
Fns . These must add up to the pump value: Fn = Fni +Fns .
Only pairs of values Fni and Fns which are between 1 and 54
and which sum to Fn values between 3 and 89 are kept.
sition of states with OAM equal to Fibonacci numbers.
For the new protocol, we choose N consecutive values,
F = {Fn0 , Fn0+1, . . . , Fn0+N−1}, and assign a block of
binary digits to each so that equal numbers of 0’s and 1’s
occur. If OAM values in this set are used, each photon
generates enough digits to encode log2N bits of informa-
tion. Here, we assume N = 8 to illustrate the potential
for high capacity. For example, the Fibonacci numbers
from 3 to 89 may be assigned three-digit blocks as follows:
3 = 000 8 = 010 21 = 100 55 = 110
5 = 001 13 = 011 34 = 101 89 = 111
(5)
Three key digits are then carried by the OAM of a sin-
gle photon. The values in F must be arranged to be de-
tected with equal probability; see appendix A. The SPDC
spiral bandwidth (range of OAM values) must be suffi-
cient to span the largest gap in F . Bandwidths over 40
have been achieved18, so the values used here are cur-
rently practical. Greater bandwidths allow larger sets F ,
increasing both information capacity and security. For
simplicity, we assume that OAM sorters19–21 only allow
positive OAM values to reach the detectors. (Including
negative values doubles the capacity for the same F ; see
appendix D.)
Imagine a photon with OAM in F (take l = Fn = 21
as an example) entering the crystal. The resulting signal
and idler OAM, li and ls, are not necessarily Fibonacci,
but the OAM sorters may be arranged to allow only pho-
tons with OAM in F (li = Fni , ls = Fns) to register. For
collinear SPDC (type I or type II) OAM conservation
implies Fni + Fns = Fn. The Fibonacci recursion rela-
tion forces Fni and Fns to be the two Fibonacci numbers
immediately preceding Fn (Fn−2 = 8 and Fn−1 = 13 in
3FIG. 3: Possible outcomes (a) for the case where the total
OAM is l = 21. Neither Alice nor Bob knows the value re-
ceived by the other; each knows that the two transmitted val-
ues must be adjacent Fibonacci numbers, but neither knows
if the other’s value is larger or smaller than their own. This
replaces the ambiguity introduced in standard protocols by
the nonorthogonality of the possible polarization bases (b),
where a vector along one axis in the A basis could be mea-
sured along either axis in the B basis.
our example). However, which reaches Bob and which
reaches Alice is undetermined, so there are two possibili-
ties (Figure 3 (a)). Suppose Bob receives li = 8 and Alice
receives ls = 13. Then Alice doesn’t know if Bob has 8
or 21 (the Fibonacci value before hers, or the one after).
Similarly, Bob doesn’t know if Alice has 5 or 13. To de-
termine each other’s values, each must send one classical
(potentially public) bit to the other (see Fig. 4). They
then add their values to get the pump value Fn = 21,
which serves as one segment of the key.
The protocol utilizes two complementary sources of
ambiguity for secure communication: uncertainty in how
the OAM Fibonacci state is decomposed between Alice
and Bob minimizes the amount of information an eaves-
dropper could obtain from the classical exchange (see ap-
pendix B), whereas Eve reveals her presence through her
failure to uniquely identify a particular OAM value in
the quantum channel due to uncertainty as to which of
two possible superpositions it originates from (see be-
low). Detailed security analysis will be conducted else-
where, but appendix C points out the inherent immunity
to photon-number-splitting attacks and the possibility of
a new type of decoy state.
Detecting eavesdropping. The usual method of
detecting eavesdroppers employs two (or more1–3) mu-
tually unbiased bases (Figure 3 (b)). However, in the
current setting a more novel possibility arises. Pho-
tons leaving the spiral are in superposition states:
|Ψ0〉 = 1√N
∑
n |Fn〉. Down conversion splits each |Fn〉
into a state of form |Ψ1〉 = C1
∑
n,l |l〉A|Fn − l〉B .
The sorters pick out values l ∈ F , leading to entan-
gled combinations of consecutive Fibonacci numbers:
|Ψ〉 = C2
∑
n {|Fn−1〉A|Fn−2〉B + |Fn−2〉A|Fn−1〉B} . As-
FIG. 4: Scheme for classical information exchange. Alice first
sends Bob one bit according to the scheme in the middle row.
Since Bob knows Alice must have either the Fibonacci num-
ber before his or the one after, this is sufficient for him to
deduce her value. Bob then transmits one bit to Alice. To
minimize Eve’s ability to reconstruct the values, Bob uses the
same scheme Alice did when her value is even (top row), but
uses the conjugate scheme (0’s and 1’s interchanged) when
her value is odd (bottom row). Both now know each other’s
values, and can add them to get the value l = Fn of the pump,
but an eavesdropper cannot (see appendix B for more detail).
Fn then serves as the key segment.
sume that the entangled photons are created in lab A and
Alice measures her value immediately, while the other
photon is still in transit to lab B.
If Alice measures lA = 8, the state reaching Bob will
be a superposition, 1√
2
{|5〉B + |13〉B} . Suppose Eve in-
tercepts Bob’s photon and measures lB = 5. She then
resends a new photon to Bob in place of the one she
intercepted. She knows she should transmit a superposi-
tion, but she must guess which superposition to prepare:
1√
2
{|5〉B + |13〉B} or 1√2 {|1〉B + |5〉B}? So when Bob
makes his measurement, he will find the possible values
1, 5, or 13, with respective probabilities 14 ,
1
2 , and
1
4 .
But, given Alice’s measurement of 8, the only values he
should be receiving are 5 and 13, with probability 12 each.
So the security protocol has Alice and Bob telling each
other their values for a randomly selected subset: if Eve
has been at work, 25% of the time they will have val-
ues which are not adjacent (like 1 and 8 in the example
above). If no problem appears in the security subset, the
remaining photons then generate the high capacity key:
if n photon pairs are left after security checks, Alice and
Bob share a 3n-digit key. Generalizing from three-digit
segments per photon to longer segments involving larger
Fn, is obvious.
Advantages. Besides increased capacity per photon,
the Fibonacci protocol has several advantages: (i) In-
tercepting one of the photons by itself does not allow
Eve to determine that key segment, since each photon
only carries half the information needed to reconstruct
the key. (ii) Carried out in free space, irrelevant pho-
tons coming from the ambient light tend to be automat-
4ically screened out, since only photons with Fibonacci-
valued OAM contribute. (iii) Randomized OAM values
are produced in a completely passive manner, without
need for active switching of holograms, as required by
other OAM-based QKD approaches, greatly speeding up
key generation rates. (iv) The Fibonacci numbers have
gaps between them, reducing misattribution errors. (v)
Fibonacci coding can be more efficient than binary cod-
ing for some purposes22. (vi) Unlike in polarization-based
QKD, no alignment of reference frames is needed. (vii)
The procedure is, in principle, highly scalable: to use at
longer distances, the crystal may be pumped at higher
intensity and the alphabet of Fibonacci numbers F can
be increased in size, allowing the same rate of key genera-
tion despite increased losses. The use of multiple parallel
detectors reduces speed limitations on the detection side.
One disadvantage is that the classical exchange in-
cludes information about the actual key (not just about
measurement bases, as in other protocols). If Eve inter-
cepts it, she can narrow possibilities for each three-digit
segment from 8 down to three or four (appendix B). She
cannot determine the value uniquely, but preventing Eve
from obtaining any information about the key at all is
highly desirable. A variation of the protocol which elim-
inates this weakness is in fact possible, at the cost of
increased complexity; a description of this is in prepara-
tion.
Finally, the protocol depends only on the recurrence
relation, not on the starting values of the sequence. So
an identical protocol exists, for example, for the Lucas
sequence13. More generally, other two-term recursion re-
lations may also be used.
We have demonstrated a new realization of high-
capacity, high-efficiency quantum cryptography, based on
specially engineered OAM-entangled states of light and
a new QKD protocol exploiting recursive properties of
the Fibonacci sequence. We believe this approach is gen-
eral enough to lead to novel QKD implementations us-
ing other physical variables, such as encoding Fibonacci
numbers in phase.
Appendix A: Equalization of probabilities
If some of the values in the chosen set of Fibonacci
numbers are more likely than others to contribute to the
key, this bias provides a loophole that the eavesdropper
can use to compromise security. Since neither the golden
angle spiral nor the down conversion process have flat dis-
tributions in the space of angular momentum values, we
must somehow equalize the probabilities of the Fn values
detected. This can be done in several ways. First, by ap-
propriately engineering the spiral source and altering the
distance of the spiral from the down conversion crystal,
there is a measure of control over the spectrum that in
principle can be used to flatten the OAM spectrum. How-
ever, a simpler solution is simply to insert filters in the
apparatus. Filters can be designed that allow some angu-
lar momenta to pass with higher probability than others,
and so these can be used to compensate for the distribu-
tion in the signal and idler beam after the crystal. A still
simpler solution is to place filters before the detectors.
The sorters convert different angular momentum values
into different spatial locations, so a filter of appropriate
transmission probability can be placed at each position.
This last possibility has at least two additional advan-
tages: (i) Each filter need only be chosen to transmit a
particular proportion of the total intensity; its transmis-
sion profile does not need to be OAM-dependent. (ii)
This adds an additional contribution to security, since
even when Eve intercepts a photon and resends a copy,
she does not know if the one she sends will be one of
those that survive the filtering process at the end, thus
essentially adding noise to Eve’s signal, but not to Alice’s
or Bob’s. This reduces her effective eavesdropping rate.
Appendix B: Security from eavesdropping
In the main text, a scheme is described in which Alice
and Bob exchange one bit each of classical information
in order to determine each other’s values. They then
add the two values together to get the orbital angular
momentum l = Fn of the pump, and that total value
serves as a segment of the key. Here we point out that
for an eavesdropper listening in on the classical channel,
the information exchanged is insufficient to determine the
value. Using the procedure that was outlined, each clas-
sical exchange leads to ambiguous results for Eve:
Eve sees: 00 01 10 11
l could be: 3, 21, 34, 89 3, 5, 13, 21 8, 55, 89 5, 13, 34, 55.
(A1)
(In the top row, the first digit in each pair is the classi-
cal bit sent by Alice, the second is the bit sent by Bob.)
Note that each l value except 8 can be represented by
two different classical exchanges, and that each exchange
can represent three or four different l values: if Eve in-
tercepts the classical exchange, she has a probability of
only 14 to
1
3 of correctly guessing the value of Fn, with
the average probability of a correct guess being 27.08%.
The probability of a correct guess drops as the number
N of Fibonacci values used increases. Alice and Bob can
determine each other’s values, while Eve cannot. This is
possible only because of the combined action of (i) the
entanglement and (ii) the properties of the Fibonacci re-
cursion relation.
Because of the different nature of the ambiguity in
the Fibonacci QKD protocol, a strong-light analog of
the proposed approach could be devised. A computer
could be programmed to randomly change settings on
a pair of spatial light modulators or other device in or-
der to encode pairs of adjacent Fibonacci values on the
OAM content of two strong Gaussian pulses (with all the
photons in each pulse being in the same OAM state).
The ambiguity in who has the higher of the two values
5in the Fibonacci number decomposition allows the ran-
dom key to be shared in the same manner as before.
Eve would still not be able to obtain significant infor-
mation about the key from the public exchange between
Alice and Bob. However, if Eve now intercepts the OAM
state sent to Bob (on what was previously the quantum,
single-photon channel), the eavesdropping can no longer
be revealed, since Eve may now siphon off multiple pho-
tons from the beam to reconstruct its state exactly with-
out changing the state of the remaining beam. In other
words, secure key generation with minimal information
leakage through the public exchange can be performed
with Gaussian states by exploiting Fibonacci recurrence,
but the confident detection of an in-line eavesdropper’s
presence would require the quantum regime. So this
Gaussian-state version of the Fibonacci protocol could
overcome distance limitations inherent in quantum cryp-
tography, but at the cost of losing the security gained
from the ability to reveal eavesdroppers. In exchange,
the high transmission rate of the Gaussian state proto-
col would allow for sufficient privacy amplification to be
implemented in order to bring the information available
to Eve back down to a very low level, allowing overall
security to be maintained.
Appendix C: Photon-splitting attacks, decoy states,
and security
In QKD, the goal is always to send single photons, but
in reality what are sent are attenuated pulses with mean
photon number less than one. There will always be some
pulses containing more than one photon each. In some
standard protocols, such as BB84, all of the photons in
the same pulse undergo the same preparation (passing
through the same polarizer or same hologram), so they
come out with the same polarization or the same OAM.
This leads to a serious security problem23–26. Splitting
off one photon from each pulse, Eve can measure its state
without altering the state of the remaining photons. She
sends the remainder of the pulse on to Bob via a channel
of lower loss than the original one, in order to mask the
fact that she has removed some of the photons. Mea-
sures must be taken to safeguard against such photon-
number splitting attacks, for example by insertion of de-
coy states27.
However, in the Fibonacci protocol, the situation is
different. If a multiphoton pulse is sent into the spiral
source, there is no reason for the photons that come out
to be in the same state: they will be distributed among
the different Fibonacci numbers in the same manner as
they would if they had been sent in one by one. Siphon-
ing off one photon from a pulse will tell the eavesdrop-
per nothing about the state of the other photons in that
pulse. So, the Fibonacci protocol is intrinsically immune
to photon-number splitting attacks.
Security can be further enhanced by using a new type
of decoy state that is already present automatically in
the setup. When the pump photon of OAM Fn pro-
duces the down conversion pair with OAM li and ls,
angular momentum conservation requires Fn = li + ls.
The bits used to construct the key come from the in-
stances in which this is satisfied by the outgoing angular
momenta equalling the two previous Fibonacci numbers:
Fn = Fn−1 + Fn−2. However, the conservation relation
can also be satisfied by values of li and ls, neither of
which are Fibonacci (for example: 13 = 9 + 4, in which
13 is Fibonacci but 4 and 9 are not), or in instances
where one of the outgoing values is a Fibonacci num-
ber while the other is not (for example, 13 = 3 + 10, in
which 13 and 3 are Fibonacci, while 10 is not). Consider
the latter case, i.e. Fn = Fm + l, where m ≤ n − 3
and l is not Fibonacci. If Eve detects the Fibonacci
value Fm on its way to Bob, she has no way of know-
ing that Alice’s number is not Fibonacci, so she will send
Bob one of the two superpositions 1√
2
(|Fm〉+ |Fm−1〉) or
1√
2
(|Fm〉+ |Fm+1〉). However, after measurements are
completed, Alice and Bob can exchange information let-
ting each other know for which photons they received Fi-
bonacci or non-Fibonacci values. If Alice measures non-
Fibonacci value |l〉, then the state arriving in Bob’s lab
should be 1√
N
∑
n |Fn − l〉. All but one of the terms in
this sum will be non-Fibonacci-valued, with the excep-
tion being the term where Fn − l = Fm. Suppose Bob
compares the state he receives to a test state of the form
|ψtest〉 = 1√
N
{|Fn0〉 − |Fn0+1〉+ |Fn0+2〉 (A1)
−|Fn+3〉+ · · · ± |Fn0+N−1〉} ,
with alternating signs between terms. This state has
nonzero inner product with each individual Fibonacci
state, but is orthogonal to all pairwise superpositions of
consecutive Fibonacci states. So, when Alice receives
a non-Fibonacci number, Bob should expect the inner
product between his state and the test state to be 1√
N
(due to the Fm term in the sum), whereas if Eve has
tampered with the state he will instead find the overlap
to be equal to zero. Bob will once again be able to detect
Eve’s interference through a large (ideally 100%) drop in
his detection rate for the subset of events where Alice
receives non-Fibonacci values.
Instead of intercept-and-resend or photon-number-
splitting attackes, Eve may instead try to clone the state
and then send one copy on, keeping the other to mea-
sure after intercepting the classical exchange. This, how-
ever runs afoul of the no-cloning theorem28; she can only
make perfect clones if the possible states are mutually
orthogonal and if she knows what they are. Since the su-
perpositions Eve intercepts are not mutually orthogonal,
detectable errors will again be introduced.
A more detailed analysis of security issues in the Fi-
bonacci protocol will appear elsewhere.
6FIG. A5: A variation of fig. 1 that makes use of both positive
and negative orbital angular momentum values to double key
generation capacity. Rather than keeping only positive values,
both signs are kept. Alice and Bob must exchange classical
information to tell each other the signs of each detection.
Appendix D: Doubling the information capacity
In the main text, we assumed that only positive orbital
angular momentum (OAM) values were used, in order to
keep the explanation relatively simple. The OAM sorters
before the detectors in fig. 1 of the main text allow us
to divert negative OAM values away from the detectors,
keeping only positive signal and idler values. This in
turn implies that only positive-OAM pump photons con-
tribute.
However, negative OAM values are also created by the
source, at the same rate as the positive values. It is
to our advantage to expand the setup to make use of
these, rather than letting half of the created photons go
to waste. When we do this, we find that the number of
bits of key generation per photon can be doubled.
A schematic of the expanded setup is shown in fig. A5.
Alice and Bob count their positive and negative angular
momentum values separately, and during the classical ex-
change let each other know the signs they received. They
then only keep the trials on which they received the same
signs. (This is in a sense analogous to keeping only the
sets of matching bases in the BB84 and E91 protocols.)
Each positive or negative Fibonacci number can then rep-
resent a four-digit binary string:
l Binary string l Binary string
3 0000 −3 1000
5 0001 −5 1001
8 0010 −8 1010
13 0011 −13 1011
21 0100 −21 1100
34 0101 −34 1101
55 0110 −55 1110
89 0111 −89 1111
So we now have 16 possible outcomes for the key seg-
ment, with each segment capable of encoding 4 bits of
information via a single photon.
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